We will have our weekly meeting on Thursday, May 26th, at 7pm in Wellman 233. Alan Gramage will be presenting on a talk on Phenomenology of Narcissism.
Hope to see you there!
A central activity of philosophers of science is to offer analyses of central concepts of the sciences they study. Understanding concepts serves as an aid to solving conceptual puzzles and problems about scientific reasoning, concepts, theories and methods as well as interpreting the results and explanations of science and what they imply about the world we live in. In the case of philosophy of biology, the specialty I practice, central concepts of biology include: gene, cell, population, species, and ecological community, and also evolution, natural selection, inheritance, metabolism, growth, and development. Philosophers often understand analysis as “conceptual analysis”: offering individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a concept to hold of some object, event, or process. In contrast to this understanding, I was raised in a tradition developed substantially by my mentor, William C. Wimsatt at the University of Chicago, in which concepts, models and theories in science are thought to be better understood in terms of heuristics. In this talk I will contrast approaches to understanding science through analysis and heuristics, characterize some important features of Wimsatt’s account of modeling in scientific practice, and emphasize a role for philosophers for science as well as philosophers of science Hope to see you there!
We will have our weekly meeting on Thursday, May 12th, at 7pm in Wellman 233. Professor Gilmore will be presenting during the meeting. The talk is entitled “A Cartesian Argument Against Compositional Nihilism”.
We will have our weekly meeting on Thursday, May 5th, at 7pm in Wellman 233. Jarom Longhurst, a philosophy undergrad, will be presenting this week on a topic in philosophy of economics. We will also have a social event 8:30 pm at de Vere’s Irish Pub on E Street.
Here is a poster related to their work that they recently presented at a conference: http://www.tedshear.com/documents/identifications_poster.pdf
Hope to see you there!
We will have our weekly meeting on Thursday, March 21, at 7 pm in Wellman 230. Tyrus Fisher will be presenting this week on “Are Indicative Conditionals Just Material Conditionals?”. Here below is the abstract for the speech.
“Philosophers care about which inference patterns are reliable and why. Indicative conditionals—sentences of the form ‘if P, then Q’—figure crucially in many of the in- ference patterns we employ. Whether such patterns are reliable is largely a function of the meaning of the indicative conditional. But theories of meaning for conditionals engender deep puzzles. My talk will be about one of these puzzles. Briefly, one way to motivate the puzzle is as follows. Indicative conditionals with false antecedents often seem false—e.g., the conditional ‘if the moon is made of cheese, then I will win the presidential election’ sounds awful. Nevertheless, if the material-conditional analysis is correct, then such conditionals must be true. That in mind, our puzzle arises when we take stock of the arguments in favor of the material-conditional analysis: There are a number of simple and forceful arguments which seem to show that our English indicative conditional must have the truth conditions of the material conditional; but, intuitively, it seems it cannot.”